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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAMONT EPPERSON, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
v. : 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, Case No. 970075-CA 
Respondent/Appellee. Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Utah State Retirement Board which 
dismissed Petitioner's Request for Board Action. This court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. 63-46b-16 to review a final agency action in a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue in this case is whether a divorced spouse of a retired Fire Department 
employee is entitled to a court ordered share of his death benefit if the retirant is not 
survived by a spouse to whom he was married at the time of death. 
The standard of review is a correction-of-error standard as set forth in Morton 
International. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1991) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In accordance with the rules of procedure for determining retirement claims, 
Petitioner filed a Request for Board Action with the Retirement Board seeking a 
determination that his former spouse, Verla Epperson, would be entitled to death benefits 
which were awarded to her in the divorce action if she survives him. The Retirement 
Board argued that the applicable statute, Section 49-5-704 Utah Code Ann, permits a 
death benefit to a former spouse in accordance with an award of a divorce court only if the 
retirant has remarried and is survived by the subsequent spouse. Petitioner argued that the 
statute clearly provides divorced spouses with retirement and death benefits when ordered 
by the divorce decree regardless of the retirant's marital status at the time of death. In the 
alternative, Petitioner attempted to present evidence that recent amendments to the statute 
at issue, drafted with the assistance of Board counsel, were specifically intended to 
provide death and retirement benefits to Petitioner's spouse. The Board refused to admit 
evidence of legislative intent and ruled the former spouse ineligible for any portion of 
Petitioner's death benefits. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Petitioner and Verla Epperson were divorced on April 13, 1992. (R. pp. 2-10, 
24, 73) after over 43 years of marriage. 
2. Throughout the marriage Petitioner was an employee of the Salt Lake City Fire 
Department (the Fire Department). (R. p. 24) 
3. Petitioner retired from the Fire Department on September 1, 1992. (R. p. 73) 
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4. The Fire Department opted out of the Social Security system maintaining 
instead its own pension benefit system. Verla Epperson is not entitled to any Social 
Security benefits stemming from Petitioner's employment with the Fire Department. (T. 
p. 33) 
5. When Petitioner retired from the Fire Department, a Domestic Relations Order 
was signed providing that Mrs. Epperson was entitled to 50% of Petitioner's pension 
benefits and "100% of the spouse's death benefit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 49-5-
704...." (R. p. 25) 
6. Verla Epperson has not remarried, is 66 years old, unemployed and worked only 
sporadically during the marriage entitling her to a very small social security benefit in her 
own right. 
7. Petitioner is 69 years old, suffers from leukemia and is in failing health. 
8. Petitioner has not remarried. (R. p. 73) 
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
THE DECISION BY THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
This is a case of first impression interpreting the 1994 amendments to Section 49-
5-704 Utah Code Ann.. The Board held that Section 49-5-704 creates a "spousal death 
benefit" only if there is a surviving spouse to whom the member is married at the time of 
death. Otherwise, there is no death benefit to award to Petitioner's former spouse. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Board erred when it ruled that section 49-5-704 requires a retirant be married 
at the time of death in order for a former spouse to receive survivors benefits awarded to 
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her in the divorce. Petitioner's former spouse, Verla Epperson, was awarded all of 
Petitioner's survivors benefits in their divorce decree if he dies before she does regardless 
of his marital status. Petitioner has brought this action to insure that his former wife is 
provided with these benefits after he dies. The only dispute is with the Retirement 
Board's interpretation of the applicable statute which is not consistent with the plain 
language of the statute and, to the extent the statute is at all ambiguous, ignores the 
history of both this case and the amendment to the statute. The Board further erred in 
refusing to allow evidence of legislative history to prove legislative intent. 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner attempted to introduce evidence by way of the testimony Representative 
Mary Carlson which would have proved that the legislative intent in amending Section 49-
5-704 was to provide benefits to Verla Epperson in particular, and similarly situated 
divorced spouses in general. That evidence would have shown that Verla Epperson was 
awarded a one half interest in Petitioner's pension fund at the time of their divorce in 
1992. When Petitioner retired, Mrs. Epperson learned that the Fire Department had opted 
out of the Social Security system and if Petitioner died before she did she would not be 
entitled to any Social Security benefits or survivor benefits from his 43 years employment 
with the Fire Department. Knowing that Petitioner suffered from a fatal disease, and 
fearing he would die prematurely leaving her with virtually no income, Mrs. Epperson 
sought the assistance of her State Representative, Mary Carlson. 
Representative Carlson contacted the Retirement Board and discussed Mrs. 
Epperson's situation with the Board. It was determined that a change in Section 49-5-704 
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was necessary to make Mrs. Epperson eligible to receive survivor benefits. Counsel for 
the Retirement Board helped craft the language of HB 32. Representative Carlson 
sponsored the bill which was passed and signed into law in 1994. This law amended the 
provisions of Section 49-5-704 to its present language. While it is true these amendments 
would benefit all individuals who are similarly situated, the amendments were written for, 
sponsored on behalf of and intended to provide benefits to Verla Epperson. 
After passage of the legislation, Mrs. Epperson contacted the Retirement Board 
and was told she needed a Domestic Relations Order awarding her a portion Petitioner's 
death benefit. The complying order was signed by District Court Judge Pat B. Brian on 
May 10, 1996. (R. pp. 23-29) She then learned that the Board's interpretation of the 
1994 amendments to Section 49-5-704 would deny her benefits unless her former 
husband, Petitioner, was married at the time of his death. Petitioner, believing that his 
former spouse was entitled to receive those benefits regardless of his marital status at the 
time of death, objected to the Board's interpretation of the law and petitioned for a formal 
determination of future benefits in compliance with Rule 1 of the Board's rules governing 
declaratory orders. 
Denying Petitioner's request to present legislative history to prove legislative 
intent, the Board dismissed the Request interpreting the 1994 amendment as requiring that 
a retirant remarry and be survived by a dependent spouse in order for his divorced spouse, 
Mrs. Epperson, to receive the death benefits she was awarded in the divorce. The Board 
further ruled that the statute in question was clear and unambiguous on its face and denied 
Petitioner's request to introduce evidence of legislative history and intent. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 49-5-704 DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A RETIRANT REMARRY 
IN ORDER FOR A FORMER SPOUSE TO RECEIVE COURT ORDERED 
DEATH BENEFITS. 
Section 49-5-704 provides: 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3), the death benefit 
payable to a dependent spouse after death of the retirant is a monthly 
amount equal to 75% of the allowance being paid to the retirant at the time 
of death. 
(b) The effective date of the accrual of this pension is the first 
day of the month following the month the retirant died. 
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (3), payment of the full 
pension for this latter month shall be made to the dependent beneficiary 
instead of the deceased member. 
(2) If the member retires under Division B and dies leaving 
dependent children, they qualify for benefits prescribed for children under 
Section 49-5-701 or 49-5-702. 
(3) (a) In the event of a court order complying with Section 49-1-
609 a former spouse of a retired member is entitled to the court designated 
share of the retirant's monthly retirement benefit and the court designated 
share of the spouse's death benefit. 
(b) This subsection superseded conflicting subsections of this 
section. 
Respondent held that this Section should be interpreted to mean that a death 
benefit only comes into existence if there is a dependent spouse to whom the retirant is 
married at the time of death. In making this determination, the Board ignored the clear 
intent of subsection (3) to provide benefits to a, former spouse of the retirant when 
ordered in the parties' divorce decree. 
The plain language of subsection (3) and the 1994 amendment make it clear that its 
purpose is to provide a means for a divorced, dependent spouse to receive a portion of the 
retirant's retirement and death benefits. It was clearly not intended to only provide a 
means for dividing a death benefit between a current and former spouse in the event the 
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retirant remarries. Had that been the legislature's intent, it could have easily made that 
clear just as it has in other sections of the retirement act. For instance, the code provision 
which provides for death benefits to inactive members states: 
49-5-703 (2) (a) The death benefit payable monthly on behalf of an 
inactive member who dies and is survived by a spouse to whom that 
member was married at the time of death is 50% of the amount the 
member would have received had the member retired on the first day of the 
month following the month death occurred.... Utah Code Ann, [emphasis 
supplied] 
If the legislature wanted to provide death benefits to a former spouse in Section 
49-5-704 only if the retirant was married at the time of death, it would have added the 
same or similar language found in Section 49-5-703. By not including similar language it 
must mean that the term spouse can be used to include former spouse, or someone to 
whom the member was not married at the time of death. 
Section 49-5-704 is clearly written to provide a portion of a retirant's retirement 
and death benefits to a former spouse when ordered by the court. In fact, this statute was 
written for the specific purpose of providing those benefits to Mrs. Epperson. 
Respondent's argument that the statute was intended to provide benefits to a former 
spouse only if her ex-husband remarries is not supported by any language in the statute, is 
directly contradicted by the purpose for adopting this particular statute, and is arbitrarily 
narrow. The only reasonable interpretation of the law is that Mrs. Epperson is entitled to 
receive Petitioner's death benefit if he predeceases her regardless of his marital status in 
accordance with the provision of their divorce decree. 
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II. THE RETIREMENT BOARD ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE 
INTRODUCTION OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY TO ESTABLISH 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
Legislative history is only admissible to prove legislative intent when the statute in 
question is ambiguous. Then the court will "seek guidance from the legislative history and 
relevant policy considerations." World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency. 879 P.2d 
253 (Utah 1994) Ambiguous is defined in Webster's Desk Dictionary as "capable of being 
understood in more than one way." The dispute in this case involves the interpretation of 
a statute. Petitioner believes the statute clearly entitles Mrs. Epperson to receive a 
spouse's death benefit if she survives him. If there is any doubt about that, the legislative 
history would be highly relevant since it would show that the statute in question was 
intended to resolve this specific case. The Board's refusal to allow that evidence into the 
formal record in this case was clear error. 
The Board's refusal to admit evidence of legislative history was based on its 
finding that the statute was clear and unambiguous. Respondent admitted that the statute 
was unclear in its Motion to Dismiss stating that there is a "cloud over the meaning of the 
statute in question here." (R. pp. 37, 48) Yet Respondent strenuously objected to the 
introduction of any legislative history. When even the Respondent admitted the statute 
was subject to a different interpretation, the Board should have allowed the introduction 
of legislative history to establish intent. 
Respondent's reading of the statute is both tortured and disingenuous in light of 
the history of this case. The Retirement Board was asked by Representative Carlson for 
assistance in the drafting of legislation to provide benefits to this very party. To be asked 
to assist a legislator in the drafting of legislation which will provide benefits to Mrs. 
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Epperson and then to subsequently claim that the legislation did NOT do what was 
intended AND to block introduction of the very legislative history which will prove intent 
is duplicitous. This is especially true in light of Respondent's characterization that there 
was a "cloud over the meaning of the statute in question here." 
The court can also look to relevant policy considerations in interpreting the statue. 
Since the Fire Department opted out of the Social Security system, its replacement 
pension plan should provide benefits of an equivalent nature. Had the Fire Department 
contributed to the Social Security system, Mrs. Epperson would have been eligible for 
survivor benefits after ten years of marriage. Here, after 43 years of marriage, she will 
receive no survivor benefits. In a society where we encourage women to stay at home, we 
should not render them financially destitute in the event of a divorce. 
The Adjudicative Hearing Officer erroneously concluded that the statute denied 
benefits to Petitioner and erred in holding that the statute was clear and unambiguous on 
its face. Petitioner brought Representative Carlson to the hearing to testify on the 
legislative history and intent in this case. (T. p. 3) She would have testified that it was the 
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intent of the legislature to provide benefits to Mrs. Epperson and former spouses similarly 
situated regardless of the marital status of the retirant at the time of death. This evidence 
should have been admitted. 
IE. THE STATUTE IN QUESTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN LIBERALLY 
CONSTRUED SO AS TO PROVIDE BENEFITS IN THIS CASE. 
Section 49-1-102 (2) states: "This title should be liberally construed to provide 
maximum benefits and protections consistent with sound fiduciary and actuarial 
principles." 
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The statute in question here was intended to provide benefits to Petitioner's former 
spouse, Verla Epperson. The most logical reading of that statute would in fact provide 
her with those benefits. The Retirement Board should have "liberally construed" the 
provisions to provide her with those benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 49-5-704 was written to provide benefits to Verla Epperson. The clear 
language of that statute would provide her with those benefits. Petitioner asks this Court 
to rule that the death benefit in question will go to Mrs. Epperson if she survives 
Petitioner regardless of his marital status at the time of death. In the alternative, Petitioner 
asks the Court of Appeals to remand this case to the Retirement Board with instructions 
to admit evidence of legislative history to prove legislative intent. 
Dated this 28th day of May, 1997. 
~/AK 
Suzan Pixton 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of May, 1997,1 delivered two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner/ Appellant to: 
Howard & Associates 
Daniel D. Andersen 
560 East 200 South, Suite 230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 ^ 
^ ts~f 
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ADDENDUM 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
LAMONT EPPERSON, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Respondent. 
DECLARATORY ORDER 
FACTS 
1. Petitioner Lamont Epperson retired from the Salt Lake City Fire Department on 
September 1,1992. 
2. Mr. Epperson is alive and currently receiving a monthly retirement benefit from the 
Utah Retirement Systems. 
3. Mr. Epperson and his former spouse, Verla Epperson, were divorced on April 13, 
1992. 
4. Mrs. Epperson is currently receiving a portion of Mr. Epperson's monthly retirement 
benefit pursuant to a domestic relations order. 
5. Mr. Epperson has not remarried since his divorce from Mrs. Epperson. 
LAW 
Utah Code Annotated §49-5-704 states: 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3), the death benefit payable to a dependent 
spouse after death of the retirant is a monthly amount equal to 75% of the allowance being paid to 
the retirant at the time of death. 
(b) The effective date of accrual of this pension is the first day of the month 
following the month the retirant died. 
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (3), payment of the full pension for this 
latter month shall be made to the dependent beneficiary instead of the deceased member. 
(2) If the member retires under Division B and dies leaving dependent children, they 
qualify for benefits prescribed for children under Section 49-5-701 or 49-5°702o 
(3) (a) In the event of a court order complying with Section 49=1 -609 a former spouse 
of a retired member is entitled to the court designated share of the retirant's monthly retirement 
benefit and the court designated share of the spouse's death benefit. 
(b) This subsection supersedes conflicting subsections of this section. 
ORDER 
Utah Code Annotated Section 49-5-704(1) (a) creates a spousal death benefit only if the 
firefighter is remarried at the time of death. Section (3) (a) grants a former spouse a right to a court 
ordered share of the firefighter's monthly retirement benefit while he is alive, and a court ordered 
portion of the current spouse's death benefit. If no spousal death benefit exists under Section (l)(a), 
a former spouse has no spousal death benefit upon which a claim can be made. 
Assuming Mr. Epperson is not remarried at the time of his death, Mrs. Epperson, as a former 
spouse, has no right to a death benefit under the statute. 
iUi
- IZJ^M 
jMis L. BARKER, DATE 
ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER 
c:\...dan\eppmo2.pld 
^ y ^ t y > / //. ,^«.A/^-. 
Edgar H. Throndsen, Board President Date 
/ 
49-5-601 PENSIONS 864 
PART 6 
BENEFIT ADJUSTMENTS 
49-5-601. Annual cost-of-l iving al lowance* 
(1) (a) The retirement office shall compute and pay, upon 
approval by the board, an annual coat-of-living adjust-
ment to all retired members after those members have 
been retired for one year. 
(b) The adjustment is equal to the decrease in the 
purchasing power of the dollar during the preceding year, 
as measured by the Consumer Price Index, United States 
City Average, prepared by the United States Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, and is limited to a maximum of 4% of the 
retirant's or beneficiary's original retirement allowance. 
(c) Decreases in the purchasing power of the dollar 
exceeding 4% annually are accumulated and used in 
subsequent allowances when the cost-of-living adjust-
ment is less than 4% annually. 
(2) (a) The cost-of-living adjustment shall be reduced if the 
index shows a decline of 4% or more during any period of 
more than one year. 
(b) These reductions may not exceed 2% per year based 
upon the original retirement allowance. 
(c) Payments made under this section are a part of the 
retired member's allowance. 
(d) Payments and adjustments for the retirant also 
apply to the beneficiary who is paid an allowance under 
optional retirement plans. 
(e) The net cost of increasing the coat-of-living adjust-
ment from 2 Wh to 4% annually under this section, after 
recognizing the decrease in the contribution rates for 
actuarial expense, is 1.74% for Division A firefighters and 
1.9% for Division B firefighters. The net cost shall be 
added to the employee contribution rate in Division A and 
Division B. 1994 
49-5-602. Minimum monthly allowance — Funded by 
member contributions. 
(1) In addition to the cost-of-living adjustments provided by 
Section 49-5-601, the allowance of each retirant shall be 
increased to a minimum of $500 per month and the allowance 
of each spouse who qualifies for a monthly allowance shall be 
increased to a minimum of $350 per month. 
(2) The minimum benefit provided by this section shall be 
funded by member contributions to be added to the base 
member contribution under Section 49-5-301. L990 
PART 7 
DEATH BENEFITS 
w©-701. Death of active member in Division A — 
Payment of benefits. 
If an active member of the system enrolled in Division A 
dies, the following benefits are payable: 
(1) If death is classified as line-of-duty, the dependent 
spouse receives a lump sum of $1,500 and a monthly 
allowance equal to 30% of the deceased member's final 
average monthly salary. 
(2) If death is not classified as line-of-duty, the benefit 
- is as follows: 
(a) If the member has less than ten years of service 
credit at the time of death, the member's beneficiary 
receives $1,000 or a refund of contributions, which-
ever is greater. 
(b) If the member has ten or more years of service 
credit the dependent spouse receives $500 plus a 
monthly allowance equal to 2% of the final average 
monthly salary of the deceased member for each year 
of service credit with a maximum of 30% allowed. 
(3) In the event of the death of the member and there isJ 
no spouse, the spouse's benefit shall be equally divided 
and paid to each unmarried child until the child reach*-
age 21. 
(4) If the benefit ia not distributed under this sectiou, 
and there is a beneficiary, the vested contribution shall be 
paid to the beneficiary. 1990 
49-6-702. Death of ac t ive member in Div is ion B — 
Payment of benefits. 
If an active member of the system enrolled in Division B 
dies, the following benefits are payable: 
(1) If death is classified as line-of-duty, the dependent 
spouse receives a lump sum of $1,500 and a monthly 
allowance equal to 37 Vfc% of the deceased member's final 
average monthly salary, subject to Section 49-5-503. 
(2) If death ia classified as line-of-duty, and the member 
has 20 or more years of service credit, the member shall be 
considered to have retired and the dependent spouse shall 
receive the death benefit payable to a retired member 
under Section 49-5-704. 
(3) If death is not classified as line-of-duty and the 
deceased member has five or more years of service credit, 
the death is considered line-of-duty and the same benefits 
are payable as established under Subsection (1). 
(4) If death is not classified as line-of-duty and the 
deceased member has less than five years of service 
credit, the benefit is a refund of the deceased member's 
contributions, plus 50% of the member's most recent 12 
months regular salary. 
(5) If the deceased member has five or more years of 
service credit, the member's unmarried children, until 
they reach age 21, receive a monthly allowance of $75. In 
the event of the death of the member and spouse, the 
spouse's benefits are equally divided and paid to each 
unmarried child until the child reaches age 21. The 
payments shall be made to the surviving parent or duly 
appointed guardian or pursuant to Section 49-1-607. 
(6) If the benefit is not distributed under this section, 
and there ia a beneficiary, the vested contribution shall be 
paid to the beneficiary. 
(7) The total monthly payments made on behalf of any 
one deceased member's account may not exceed 75% of 
the member's final average salary. 1992 
49-5-703. Death of active or inactive member having 
no spouse or minor children as beneficiary — 
Benefits payable to widow on death of inac-
tive member. 
(1) The death settlement payable on behalf of an active or 
inactive member who dies without spouse or minor children is 
100% of the employee's contributions or $500, whichever is 
larger. 
(2) The death benefit payable monthly on behalf of an 
inactive member who dies and is survived by a spouse to 
whom the member was married at the time of death is 50% of 
the amount the member would have received had the member 
retired on the first day of the month following the month death 
occurred, the computation being based upon years of service 
and final average salary, reduced actuarially from age 50 to 
age at death, if the member was not 50 years of age when 
death occurred. 
(3) No monthly pension may be paid under this section 
unless the member had 20 years of service credit at the time of 
death. 1994 
49-5-704. D e a t h of ret ired m e m b e r — Benefits . 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3), the death 
benefit payable to a dependent spouse after death of the 
49~6*1< 
retirant is a monthly amount equal to 76% of the allow- Section 
ance being paid to the retirant at the time of death. 
(b) The effective date of accrual of this pension is the 
first day of the month following the month the retirant 49-6-403. 
died. 49-6-404. 
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (3), payment of the 
full pension for this latter month shall be made to the 
dependent beneficiary instead of the deceased member. 
(2) If the member retires under Division B and dies leaving 
dependent children, they qualify for benefits prescribed for 
children under Section 49-5-701 or 49-5-702, 
(3) (a) In the event of a court order complying with Section 
49=4-609 a former spouse of a retired member is entitled 
to the court designated share of the retirant's monthly 
retirement benefit and the court designated share of the 
spouse's death benefit 
(b) This subsection supersedes conflicting subsections 
of this section. 1994 
PART 8 
MISCELLANEOUS 
49-5-801. Repealed. is«» 
ment benefit — Adjustment to formula perm 
ted. 
Repealed. 
Temporary retirement window for 20 years 
service. 
Part5 
Disability 
49-6-501, 49-6-502. Repealed. 
Par te 
Benefit Adj^tmest 
49-6-601. 
49-6-602. 
49-5-802. Volunteer firefighters considered members 
of the system for line-of-duty death and dis-
ability benefits in Division A — Computation 
of benefit. 
Volunteer firefighters are considered members of the system 
but are only eligible for line-of-duty death and line-of-duty 
disability benefits provided for firefighters enrolled in Division 
A, subject to Section 49-5-503 The lowest monthly salary of 
firefighters of a city of the first class in this state at the time 
of death or disability shall be the basis for computing the final 
average monthly salary payable to a volunteer firefighter, the 
surviving spouse, and children. 19*7 
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PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
49-6-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Judges' Retirement Act." 
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49-6-102. Purpose. 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a retirement plan 
forjudges which provides the following: 
(1) a uniform system of membership; 
(2) retirement requirements; 
(3) benefits for judges; 
(4) funding on an actuarially sound basis; 
(5) contributions made by employers and employees; 
and 
(6) economy and efficiency in public service. ISST 
49-6-103. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) (a) "Compensation," "salary," or *wages* means the 
total amount of payments which are currently includ-
able in gross income made by an employer to an 
employee for services rendered to the employer. 
(b) "Compensation* includes: 
(i) performance-based bonuses; 
(ii) cost-of-living adjustments; 
(iii) payments subject to Social Security de-
ductions; 
(iv) any payments in excess of the ^ATi^mn 
amount subject to deduction under Social Secu-
rity law, and 
(v) amounts which the employee authorizes to 
be deducted or reduced for salary deferral or 
other authorized benefit programs. 
(c) "Compensation" for purposes of this chapter 
may not exceed the amount allowed under Internal 
Revenue Code Section 401(aX17)o 
(d) "Compensation,* "salary,* or "wages* does not 
include: 
(i) the monetary value of remuneration paid in 
kind, such as a residence or use of equipment; 
